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Manzanet-Daniels: First Department Adopts Zubulake in the Electronic Discovery Cont

FIRST DEPARTMENT ADOPTS ZUBULAKE IN THE
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY CONTEXT
Justice Sallie Manzanet-Daniels*
In Voom HD Holdings LLC v. EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., 1 the First
Department of the New York State Appellate Division addressed when
the duty to preserve electronically-stored information ("ESI") is
triggered, and the showing necessary to impose sanctions on a party who
destroys ESI. 2 In U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Greenpoint Mortgage
Funding, Inc. , issued shortly after Voom, the First Department
4
addressed the appropriate allocation of the costs of production of ESI.
The First Department adopted the standard for preservation set forth
in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,5 as further explicated in subsequent
cases such as Pension Committee of University of Montreal Pension
Plan v. Banc ofAmerica Securities, LLC.6 Under the Zubulake standard,
"[o]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its
routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a
'litigation hold' to ensure the preservation of relevant documents." 7 This
standard comports with precedent in the traditional discovery context,
and is flexible enough to allow consideration of circumstances on a caseby-case basis, while allowing parties clear guidance concerning the
scope of their responsibilities. In Voom, the First Department ruled that
defendant EchoStar should have reasonably anticipated litigation as of
the date EchoStar sent a letter to Voom demanding an audit and
threatening termination of the parties' affiliation agreement. 8 However,
EchoStar did not issue a litigation hold on electronic evidence until after
* Justice Manzenet-Daniels is Associate Justice of the N.Y. State Appellate Division, First
Department.
1. 939 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 2012).
2. Id.at 324.
3. 939 N.Y.S.2d 395 (App. Div. 2012).
4. Id. at 396.
5. 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
6. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
7. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 218.
8.

Voom HD Holdings LLC v. EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., 939 N.Y.S.2d 321, 329 (App. Div.

2012).
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the action had been commenced, and did not cease the automatic
destruction of e-mails until four months after the action had
been instituted. 9
In determining whether to impose sanctions for spoliation of ESI,
the First Department stated that a court must consider: (1) whether "the
party with control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at
the time it was destroyed"; (2) whether the ESI was destroyed with a
"culpable state of mind"; and (3) .whether the destroyed ESI "was
relevant to the [other] party's claim or defense such that the trier of fact
could find that the evidence would support that claim or defense." 10 A
threshold consideration in any such case, often overlooked or simply
presumed, is whether the party seeking discovery sanctions has
demonstrated discovery relevance-namely, whether any material
"destroyed was likely relevant even for purposes of discovery."11 As one
court observed, "[f]or sanctions to be appropriate, it is a necessary, but
that the sought-after evidence actually existed and
insufficient, condition
'2
destroyed."'
was
In determining a party's culpable state of mind, Zubulake and its
progeny provide guidance. Failures which may support a finding of
gross negligence, once the duty to preserve ESI is triggered, include:
"(1) the failure to issue a written litigation hold, when appropriate; (2)
the failure to identify all of the key players and to ensure that their
electronic and other records are preserved; and (3) the failure to cease
the deletion of e-mails.' 13 As one court noted:
in the world of electronic data, the preservation obligation is not
limited simply to avoiding affirmative acts of destruction. Since
computer systems generally have automatic deletion features that
periodically purge electronic documents such as e-mail, it is necessary
for a party facing litigation to take active steps to halt that process. 14
In Voom, the First Department also discussed the nature of an
appropriate litigation hold."5 While recognizing that in certain instances,
for example, the case of a small company with only a few employees, an
oral hold would suffice; the First Department stated that it was

9.
10.
11.
12.
193867,
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 326.
Id. at 330.
Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429,440 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 441 (quoting Farella v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 571 1(NRB), 2007 WL
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2007)).
Voom, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
Convolve, nc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Voom, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
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nonetheless best practice to reduce a litigation hold to writing.'6 The
litigation hold should direct the appropriate employees "to preserve all
relevant records, electronic or otherwise, and create a mechanism for
collecting the preserved records .... The hold should, with as much
specificity as possible, describe the ESI at issue, [and] direct that routine
destruction policies such as auto-delete functions and rewriting over emails cease.' 7 In implementing such a hold, it is generally insufficient
"to vest total discretion in [an] employee to search and select what
[records] the employee deems relevant without the guidance and
supervision of counsel."' 8 While earlier federal district court cases
suggested that the failure to issue a litigation hold in and of itself
constituted gross negligence, the Second Circuit recently clarified in
Chin v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey'9 that the failure to
institute a litigation hold does not constitute gross negligence per se.2°
The degree of culpability and relevance factors are often entwined.
In Voom, the First Department followed Pension Committee and other
cases in ruling that relevance may be presumed or inferred depending
upon the party's degree of culpability. 2' Where a party intentionally
destroys ESI, a presumption generally arises that the missing evidence
would have been favorable to the party seeking sanctions. If a party's
destruction of ESI may be characterized as merely negligent, however,
the party seeking sanctions is not entitled to an inference, and must
prove the relevance of the destroyed ESI. Where a party is grossly
negligent in destroying ESI, courts differ as to whether such culpable
conduct compels or merely permits a presumption of relevance, and
whether any such presumption is rebuttable. According to the federal
district court in Pension Committee, any such presumption of relevance
is rebuttable. 22 The federal district court noted that a spoliating party
could rebut the presumption:
by demonstrating that the innocent party had access to the evidence
alleged to have been destroyed or that the evidence would not support
the innocent party's claims or defenses. If the spoliating party
demonstrates to a court's satisfaction that there could not have been

16. Id. at 328 n.2.
17. Id. at 328 (footnote omitted).
18. Id.
19. 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
20. Id.at 162.
21. Voom, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 327, 331; Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v.
Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456,467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
22. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 468.
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any prejudice to the innocent party, then no jury instruction
23 will be
warranted, although a lesser sanction might still be required.
In Voom, the First Department ruled that "[a]n adverse inference
was a reasonable sanction in light of EchoStar's culpability and the
prejudice to Voom. ' 24 The court noted that EchoStar had been
sanctioned for identical behavior in a previous case, demonstrating "that
EchoStar was well aware of its preservation obligations and of the
problems associated with its automatic deletion of e-mails. ''25 The First
Department found that EchoStar's destruction of e-mails "was grossly
negligent, if not intentional., 26 As such, the relevance of the destroyed
evidence was presumed.27 The First Department noted, in any event, that
Voom had in fact been prejudiced, since "snapshot" e-mails, "only
fortuitously recovered," demonstrated EchoStar's intention to declare
various breaches of the parties' affiliation agreement. 28 The First
Department found that the existence of the snapshot e-mails "permitted
the inference that the unrecoverable e-mails, of which the snapshots
29
were but a representative sampling, would have also been relevant."
The First Department rejected EchoStar's argument that Voom
could not have been prejudiced because "the missing e-mails were
merely cumulative of other evidence., 30 The court rejected the premise
that "since Voom had other means to prove its case," it had not suffered
prejudice.31 In the First Department's view, the motion court's
sanction-the imposition of an adverse inference rather than a more
severe sanction such as striking the answer-had already taken this
evidentiary overlap into account.3 2
In U.S. Bank National Ass'n, issued shortly after Voom, the First
Department adopted the Zubulake framework regarding allocation of the
costs of production of ESI.33 The court ruled that the producing party
should bear the initial costs associated with searching for, retrieving, and
producing electronically-stored information and physical documents.34
Thereafter, a court may consider whether cost-shifting may in the
23. Id.at 469.
24. Voom, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
25. Id.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
at 331-32.
Id.
Id. at 332.

31.

Id.

32. Id.
33. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 939 N.Y.S.2d 395, 399 (App.
Div. 2012).
34. Id.
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exercise of its discretion be appropriate, evaluating the seven factors
articulated by Zubulake, namely:
(1) [t]he extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover
relevant information; (2) [t]he availability of the information from
other sources; (3) [t]he total cost of production, compared to the
amount in controversy; (4) [t]he total cost of production, compared to
the resources available to each party; (5) [t]he relative ability of each
party to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) [t]he importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation; and,
35 (7) [t]he relative benefits to the
parties of obtaining the information.
Together, Voom and U.S. Bank National Ass 'n, address important
issues in the electronic discovery context, including the scope of a
party's duties and when those duties are triggered, the factors governing
imposition of an appropriate sanction for spoliation of ESI, the content
and scope of an appropriate litigation hold, and the allocation of the
costs of production in the context of electronic discovery. In adopting the
Zubulake framework, the First Department followed the majority of
federal courts considering the issue, furnishing litigants with clarity
concerning their obligations in the electronic discovery context.

35. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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